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Problem
 Prices were too high
 Prices were inefficient - not cost reflective
 Profits were too high
 Network businesses were inefficient:
 overstaffed
 gold-plated
 engineering driven
 Government interference
Reform would deliver:
 Lower prices
 Cost reflective prices
 Commercial rates of return
 Greater efficiency through
incentive-based regulation
 Customer focus
 Regulatory independence –
 from government
 Greater reliability of supply
1.   Past attitude
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2. Why is it changing?
Sitting in the dark has a way of focusing the mind
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 Response to growing power failures
 Concerns at lack of investment/expenditure
 Implications of aging infrastructure
2. Why is it changing?
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Networks played a significant role
2. Why it is changing – Lack of incentive
US
Coal
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2. Why it is changing – Lack of incentive
US
Northern California – Hydro: Oregon, Washington State, Canada
Networks played a role in the
blackouts in California.  One
reason was the congestion on
Path 15 – a link between the south
and north of California.
In 2000 there had been droughts in
the northern states which restricted
the flow of hydro based electricity
– there was electricity available
from the coal based south but it
could not reach the north because
of congestion on path 15.
The community had been against
the development of new
transmission lines
Southern California – Coal: Nevada, Arizona, Mexico,
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US
Northern California – Hydro: Oregon, Washington State, Canada
Coal
Networks played a role in the
blackouts in California.  One
reason was the congestion on
Path 15 – a link between the
south and north of California.
In 2000 there had been droughts
in the northern states which
restricted the flow of hydro based
electricity – there was electricity
available from the coal based
south but it could not reach the
north because of congestion on
path 15.
The community had been against
the development of new
transmission lines
Southern California – Coal: Nevada, Arizona, Mexico,
Report by DoE 2000  Power Outage Study Team (POST)
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2.   Why it is changing – UK: Under investment
More expenditure is required:
House of Commons, Trade & Industry Committee,2004: Report into Resilience of Electricity Networks
“The starkest summary of the problem as described to us is as follows. The total asset
base of NGC’s network is about £16 billion, while about £150 million is being spent each
year on asset replacement; which means that less than one percent of the network is being
replaced each year. At this rate it would take over 100 years to replace all the equipment
on the network.  Equipment installed now, even though in practice it might last longer than
the design life of 40 years, would fail from old age before current, older assets had all been
replaced.
The representatives from NGC said that the company’s current rate of asset replacement of about
£150 million per year would have to roughly double”
BENCHMARK ECONOMICS I
13
2.   Why it is changing – UK: Under investment
Regulatory allowances have been inadequate
“Coupled with this under-investment has been pressure to minimise operational
expenditure, for example on maintenance repair.  While this pressure has doubtless
resulted in reducing some inefficiencies, we think that to continue it may be counter-
productive for network performance…”
0 …UK House of Commons
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Private power plants to head off blackouts
Two privately built power stations are being planned by the NSW Government to help prevent the extensive blackouts
suffered by other states, but they could come at a cost to Premier Bob Carr's ambitious greenhouse targets.
Sydney Morning Herald 25/10/2004     Cost - $1.65     516 words
Bills must rise to fix state of disrepair
Charges for water, electricity and other services are likely to rise because the NSW Government has seriously undervalued
the cost of upkeep on government facilities, the state's financial watchdog has warned.
Sydney Morning Herald 28/10/2004     Cost - $1.65     574 words
Shocks to the system likely to go on
The State Government has sought to reassure the public that the electricity system is sound following several blackouts in
the past fortnight that have left suburbs in Sydney without power for hour-long stretches.
Sydney Morning Herald 29/10/2004     Cost - $1.65     482 words
The political risk in private power
It promised so much, yet has the gain of establishing the national electricity market been worth the pain? The prospect of
using surplus electricity generating capacity in NSW to supply other states was delayed by administrative intervention by
the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission which, with associated bungling, has resulted in little more than
state-based, regional electricity markets.
Sydney Morning Herald 26/10/2004     Cost - $1.65     486 words
Cable mishaps blamed for latest electricity blackouts
About 40,000 homes and businesses on the North Shore experienced blackouts yesterday afternoon when power failed at
the M osman and Castle Cove substations.
Sydney Morning Herald 27/10/2004     Cost - $1.65     231 words
2.   Why it is changing – Australia: Infrastructure failing
Infrastructure is clearly failing
…and skills base is eroding:
“…the biggest thing that stands out here is skills shortages…The 25 per cent wage increase
over 3 years for electricity linesmen in Queensland …was a classic example of the need for
more skilled workers…they were going to lose all their linesmen”           
 ...Govern r, Reserve Bank of Australia 
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2. Why it is changing – Australia:
Regulation distorting investment
Productivity Commission – Architect of electricity sector reform
“Review of the Gas Access Regime” June 2004
“…high potential for regulatory error when approving reference tariffs.  The regime requires regulators
to make decisions about future market circumstances that are uncertain.  This has led regulators to use
many debatable assumptions”
“There is a high degree of risk that the price set by the regulator is no more efficient than …in  the absence
of price regulation”
“Current regulatory approach of cost-based regulation is costly…while generating benefits, its significant
costs include a potential to distort investment”
Key recommendation is addition of less costly monitoring option:
“Choice between price regulation and monitoring…would be based on which option was assessed as
generating the greater net economic benefits”.
“Price regulation would only apply when the net benefits would be markedly greater than those
of the monitoring option”
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2.   Why is it changing?
      Aging infrastructure: the replacement cycle
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3. What are the changes?
Changes at two levels:
Macro-level: Institutions and framework
o UK House of Lords Report: :The Regulatory State: Ensuring its Accountability”, 2004
Micro-level:  Implementation
o UK, Ofgem,2004 draft pricing decision
o NSW 2004 pricing decision
o Queensland 2004 draft pricing decision
o South Australia 2004 draft pricing decision
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3. What are the changes – Macro level:
UK – House of Lords Report
The Regulatory State: Ensuring its Accountability”, 2004
“The issue of regulation has itself been a matter of Governmental concern…
regulatory reform has been high on the agenda…..
The Government is now focussing on better regulation rather than simply
deregulation…and improving accountability is a integral part of that agenda”
House of Lords report recommended “that regulated should have opportunity to have
their objections reviewed on the merits of the case by independent tribunal”
Appeal rights traced to effect of Article 6 of the European Directives Convention on Human Rights
requiring availability of a fair hearing before an independent tribunal
Australia has merits based reviews for gas;
considering extending this to electricity
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Adequacy of regulated revenues
Downward trend of expenditures and prices
reversed
WACC up 0.4% - not much, but who ever
heard of WACC rising?
X factor = 0% compared with -3%
in 2000 decision
Po Average for 14 lines companies
up 1.3% - past adjustments were
large downward adjustments to revenues
Capex allowances – up 48%
Capex claimed by lines
companies in 2000
Capex allowed by Ofgem 2000
Capex allowed by
Ofgem 2005-09
₤1775M
3. What are the changes: Implementation
UK 2004 pricing decision: a watershed
The value of the triangle is NZD 33B
in 2004 dollars
This capex has been taken from the
industry and passed through to the
customers as lower prices
It could not continue once the power
failures started…
But take heart, economists and
regulators in the electricity sector are
not the only ones to look back
Annual capex – inflation adjusted
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3. What are the changes  – Implementation
Australia NSW
IPART pricing decision 2004
“The trend of increasing consumption and reducing prices in no longer sustainable.  Over the
past 7 years, average prices have reduced in real terms by 24%, while average demand has
risen by 31%”.  In some cases growth-related expenditure has been at expense of
replacement…”
$240M
106%
$222M
30%
Country Energy
Increase
$285M
300%
$208M
24%
Integral Energy
Increase
$403M
126%
$288M
29%
EnergyAustralia
Increase
Capex  2005Opex 2005
NSW IPART 2004 Pricing decision for period 2005-2009 (A$)
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Cutting costs eventually catches up with you
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3. What are the changes - Implementation
Australia: Qld 2001 and 2005
QCA Decision 2001:
Opex cut by 2.8% for Ergon and 1.7% for Energex
each year  2001 – 2005
“The Authority considers these targets are somewhat
conservative”
An Australian study of comparative performance
concluded that Energex represented “best practice”
An international study concluded that Energex still needed
to cut its opex by 17% to move into the top quartile of
international best practice – and Ergon by 28%
….but
by 2005 both businesses were spending double their
regulated opex allowance
How could the performance comparisons be so wide
of the mark?
$474M
154%
Ergon
Increase
$392M
105%
ENERGEX
Increase
Queensland:
QCA 2004 Draft Decision
Capex 2005-2010 (A$)
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3.  What are the changes? Implementation
     South Australia 2005
Costs had been kept low for purposes
of privatisation
Regulator recognised that costs were not
in line with rest of industry
But 2004 allowances are still too low and
no catch-up was allowed after years of
depressed expenditures
Expenditures lagged by up to $200M behind
industry trend..
But business still bear the risk when the lights
go out…
$150M
68%
Capex
Increase
$122M
13%
Opex
Increase
2005ETSA Utilities
South Australia: ESCOSA 2004
Draft Decision – Opex and Capex
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3.   What are the changes? Implementation
      South Australia 2005
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3.   What are the changes? Implementation
      South Australia 2005
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4.   What went wrong?
Indeterminate regulatory framework: Incommensurable standards*
 no common set of principles
 too many objectives: economic/ social/environment
 layered objectives sending conflicting and contradictory messages
 imbalance in price considerations as consumers given first priority
Inadequate regulatory accountability
 previously Government departments accountable to Minister, Minister answerable to Parliament,
and Parliament to the people
 issues hotly debated in Parliament
 Westminster system – Ministers fell on their sword
 current system has gap between actions of regulators and their accountability to the community
Inadequate knowledge base for network economics/ engineering
 network regulation treated as ‘economics’ issue
 misunderstood objective: “efficient cost” is a concept – not a target
 treatment of network costs as a statistical issue
*Justin Gleeson SC Aust.
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4.   What went wrong?
Inadequate regulatory accountability
Australian Competition Tribunal Findings: Gas Code Appeals
 Misinterpretation of code: “Contrary to the submission of the ACCC, it is not the task of the
regulator under s8.30 of the Code to determine “a return which is commensurate with prevailing
conditions”
 Unreasonable: ”choice of lowest cost pipe for valuation purposes – it falls beyond boundaries
of what a prudent commercial operator would objectively be expected to do”
 Error in principle:" it was a fundamental error in principle for the ACCC to put aside known
valuation methodologies and devise a methodology of its own which adjusted ORC in a novel
fashion…it is properly described as idiosyncratic”
 Regulatory error: “There is no logic or reason to that approach (averaging credit ratings)
and there is no material to suggest it has any support in the theory or practice of statistics”
Like everyone else, regulators are capable of error,
some redress for the regulated is simply a matter of natural justice
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Efficient cost is a concept, not a target
“Determining…the efficient level of costs or the outcome of a competition are
matters of economic theory and practice which, on the evidence, are in the
course of constant revision, development and refinement.” 
…Judgement in EPIC case
Professor Phillip Williams, former Professor of Economics and Law at the Melbourne Business
School, an expert witness in the EPIC appeal, went beyond this and proffered the view that:
“The phrase did not have a technical economic meaning”
Yet, all regulation was, and still is, based on the objective of achieving efficient cost
If we do not know what it is, how do we know where it is, or when we have achieved it?
4.   What went wrong?
Indeterminate economics
BENCHMARK ECONOMICS I
29
Without a defined target “efficiency” is determined by statistics, not engineering analysis
Ofgem: “On quality of service, alternative regressions have not demonstrated
a statistically significant link to quality…so opex analysis has not been adjusted for
quality of service”
But, reliability can depend heavily on tree trimming and number of maintenance crews (opex) –
perhaps they should have consulted the industry engineers
Economic consultant justifying the omission of line length as an output : “customers do not demand
wires and poles, they demand electricity, the output is therefore MWh” -  but the wire/poles
connection provided to customers to allow delivery of electricity is up to 65% of network inputs
Or sometimes, rule of thumb
Ofgem:  Weights in composite variable for use in normalising costs changed from 70% connections; 15% km and MWh
in May 1999, to 50% connections, 25% each km and MWh by July 1999 – No quantitative basis
4.   What went wrong?
Indeterminate economics
Either we change the target or we find a way of measuring it
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4.   What went wrong?
      Towards improved analysis –  a small economics lesson
 Cost of production theory describes the way in which firms transform  inputs
(the factors of production) into outputs of goods and services.
 Theory states that inputs are resources purchased by the business and transformed
into network outputs or services.
 Network outputs will therefore represent the transformation of network inputs
 Inputs of poles, wires, and transformers are transformed into outputs of connectivity (poles &
wires), capacity (MW), connections (ICPs), and reliability
 Network inputs cannot produce electricity – they provide only a mode for its transport
 Electricity throughput (MWh) should not be used as an output since it has
no inputs and therefore no costs –
Effectively the marginal cost of transporting one unit of electricity is zero
This confounds the estimation of producer and consumer surplus
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4.   What went wrong?
      A small economics lesson
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4.   What went wrong?
      A small economics lesson
Throughput (GJ or MWh) is not an output.  Reducing it will
have no affect on costs
Costs are only affected by the outputs: km, MW, connection
numbers, reliability
It is arguable whether any network – especially electricity –
could cut output by refusing to connect customers or meet
peak demand
Theoretical implications of reducing output to lift profitability
therefore becomes academic
Just because the whole world uses MWh as an output
does not make it correct
BENCHMARK ECONOMICS I
33
Economies of scale - 
Average costs per customer and energy throughput (GWh)
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In 1999 Seeboard and Eastern identified as most
efficient - other networks given efficiency targets to
emulate their performance.
However, the outcome by 2003 was not in accord
with the theory:
•    one of most efficient firms in 1999 improved
     efficiency the most by 2003
•   one of least efficient made little improvement
•    greater dispersion in efficiency scores in
2003 than in 1999
In 2003, a perplexed Ofgem asked Cambridge
Economic Policy Associates to review earlier
analysis and find the problem…
4.   What went wrong?
      Network cost drivers –UK  statistical analysis
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UK and US - Efficient Frontier Analysis - Efficiency or customer density?
Opex/customer and customer density 
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Do not hold out high hopes…
CEPA in analysing network costs did not examine network
production function or even consult an engineer as to possible
cost drivers ….
Based selection of variables on precedent “representative cost
drivers”, including customer density, type of customer, losses and
scale. After statistical analysis declared that  “none of these were
statistically significant”
“While they may in practice affect costs does not appear to be
merit in including them in a statistical benchmarking exercise”
However, their estimated “efficiency” rankings did not measure
efficiency they only measured customer density
Inappropriate benchmarking plus the tendency to base future
expenditures on past experience caused large reductions in
expenditures…..
4.   What went wrong?
      Network cost drivers –UK  statistical analysis
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Australia - Real Electricity Prices - 1955-2002 
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5.   Finding our way back to the light
      Putting it into perspective:
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Coal prices fell 50% after deregulation
“Dash to gas”- still cheaper than coal
EU sulphur limits also contributed
 to dash to gas
As fuel costs declined, retail electricity
prices fell
UK: Fuel inputs and electricity prices
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5. Finding our way back to the light
 Putting it  into perspective:
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Perhaps we need a new paradigm –
more engineers and fewer economists
4.   Finding our way back to the light
      A more objective way of measuring efficiency
BENCHMARK ECONOMICS I
38
4.   Finding our way back to the light
      Another way of measuring efficiency?
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Framework
 There is an established OECD framework for efficient regulation, it should be used as base
for rewriting laws and regulations
 “Mapping” objectives, principles, rules, criteria etc would help to eliminate layered regulation
and remove conflicts, confusion, and contradiction
 Australia’s new electricity law establishing new energy regulators has streamlined the Code
Accountability
 “Right of appeal is the sine qua non of fair and equitable regulation”
….Professor David Round
 Introduction of merits based reviews should be pursued with vigour
Knowledge base
 Industry needs to understand its cost structures in terms of regulatory economics
 Regulators must step outside economic paradigm to understand network cost drivers
 Just because the industry says it ---- does not make it self-pleading
5.   Finding our way back to the light
Margaret Beardow
Principal,
BENCHMARK ECONOMICS
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